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COMMENT
SETTLING WITH YOUR HANDS TIED: 
WHY JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IS 
NEEDED TO CURB AN EXPANDING 
INTERPRETATION OF THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
PETE J. GEORGIS*
FCPA enforcement is stronger than it’s ever been—and getting 
stronger.**
INTRODUCTION
The United States has been combating corruption in international 
business transactions for over thirty years.1  By adopting legislation 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
California; B.A. 2007, Economics, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.  I would 
like to thank my family and friends for their boundless love and support.  I would also like to thank 
the Golden Gate University Law Review Editorial Board, without whose guidance this paper would 
not have been published.  I am especially grateful to Professor Wes Porter who provided helpful 
comments on a previous draft. 
** Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, Address at the 24th National Conference 
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/ 
speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html. 
1 See Ann Hollingshead, A Brief History of U.S. Policy Toward Foreign Bribery, TASK 
FORCE ON FINANCIAL INTEGRITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (July 28, 2010), 
www.financialtaskforce.org/2010/07/28/a-brief-history-of-u-s-policy-toward-foreign-bribery.  The 
United States took an assertive position to become the first country to criminalize global corporate 
bribery.  Id.  During the 1980s and 1990s, Congress negotiated with the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to seek an agreement with major trading partners that anti-
corruption legislation would be enacted. Id.  The United States has led the way in criminalizing the 
1
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criminalizing the payment of bribes overseas, the United States has been 
a leader in setting anti-corruption policies.2  Although the United States 
has endeavored to combat the unethical payment of bribes through the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),3 the vagueness of the statute—
specifically the business nexus requirement—has led to corporate 
uncertainty and unnecessarily expensive compliance programs.4  One 
factor motivating Congress’s staunch support for criminalization has 
been the devastating effect these bribes are having on global economies.5
The World Bank conservatively estimates that the annual amount of 
worldwide bribery flowing from the private sector to the public sector is 
approximately $1 trillion.6
In 1977, Congress enacted the FCPA as a component of the 1934 
Securities and Exchange Act.7  The principal goal of the law is to hold 
U.S. companies and individuals criminally liable for bribing foreign 
officials in exchange for lucrative business agreements.8  The FCPA’s 
efforts to criminalize bribery payments to foreign officials stem from the 
inimical effects such payments have on economic and political stability.9
act of bribing a public official, and has garnered the support of thirty-seven countries spanning six 
continents. See ORG. OF ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING 
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS:
RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF MARCH 2009, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/ 
40272933.pdf. 
2 Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, On the Threshold of the 
Adoption of Global Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and 
International Efforts Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 
3 (1999). 
3 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff, 78m (Westlaw 2012)). 
4 Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 259 (1997); Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA 
Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 1001 (2010).  Statutory vagueness has caused business 
entities to bar all payments to foreign officials.  Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical 
Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 259.  For example, after 
settling with the government for $500,000, a U.S. advertising firm established a policy of prohibiting 
its employees from making any payments to government officials.  Id. at 259 n.198.  This policy 
decision was aimed at avoiding potential liability in the FCPA’s grey areas.  Id.
5 See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977) (Conf. Rep.). 
6 Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global Governance 
Director Daniel Kaufmann, THE WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/KQH743GKF1 (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2012). 
7 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff, 78m (Westlaw 2012)). 
8 Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 230. 
9 Mark J. Murphy, Comment, International Bribery: An Example of an Unfair Trade 
Practice?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 385, 391 (1995). 
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These destabilizing effects stretch beyond a single country’s borders and 
permeate the global system.10  For instance, between 1994 and 1999, the 
U.S. Department of Commerce found that American exporters lost $45 
billion of international business to overseas competitors who paid 
bribes.11  Additionally, bribery is thought to have influenced the outcome 
of 294 international contracts involving $145 billion in trade.12  The 
significant effect that bribery has on the markets has also led to investors 
exiting areas with intense graft in search of less risky environments.13
Such evidence illustrates that corruption aggravates capital flight and 
discourages foreign investment, thereby significantly increasing business 
transaction costs.14  Furthermore, by threatening legitimacy and eroding 
confidence in market institutions, foreign bribery negatively impacts the 
entire international community.15  Through FCPA enforcement, the U.S. 
10 See Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 85-87 (2007). 
11 Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 256. 
12 Ambassador Cynthia P. Schneider, The Global Fight Against Bribery And Corruption: 
U.S. Law and Policy, Address at the Transparency Unveiling Corruption Conference in Amsterdam 
(Oct. 1, 1999), available at http://ihcrp.georgetown.edu/lifesciandsociety/pdfs/bribery100199.pdf. 
13 See United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network, Press Kit, The Cost of 
Corruption, Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders (Feb. 2000), available at www.un.org/events/10thcongress/2088b.htm (“‘It is widely 
acknowledged that corruption scares away foreign investment and development aid,’ according to 
Pino Arlacchi, Executive Director of the Vienna-based United Nations Office for Drug Control and 
Crime Prevention (ODCCP).  ‘Obviously, it is wiser to invest in countries with more transparency, 
independent and well-regulated banks and strong court systems.’”). 
14 Nancy Zucker Boswell, Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin America, 3 SW. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 179, 183-84 (1996) (“The former director general of development at the European 
Commission has asserted that the losses caused by corruption far exceed the sum of individual 
profits derived from it because the graft distorts the entire economy.”).  The prevalence of corruption 
affects a country’s resources, revenues, and government procurement.  Id.  As a result, public works 
contracts contain a costly premium that raises the price of a project by a significant amount.  Id.  The 
distortion of government procurement misallocates public resources and accumulates a devastating 
long-term debt.  Id.  Foreign investment is also reduced because companies are hesitant to enter a 
market when the cost of doing business is unpredictable.  Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV.
LITIG. 439, 441 (2010).  Risk-averse companies would refuse to be at the mercy of corrupt foreign 
officials when large amounts of capital hinge on government cooperation.  Id.
15 Boswell, Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin America, 3 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. at 
184 (stating that corruption threatens democracy and erodes public trust in state-owned institutions 
and government officials); Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, Statement Before the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Jan. 26, 2011), available at
www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/testimony/2011/crm-testimony-110126.html (“[C]orruption and bribery 
works to the detriment of us all, stifling competition, imposing an insidious and illegal fee on 
business transactions, and undermining the transparency and honesty of corporate culture.”); 
Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, Address at the 24th National Conference on the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/ 
3
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government is able to punish sordid business practices while encouraging 
more ethical values amongst the American public.16  More importantly, 
the United States’ interest in enforcing the FCPA is to curb economic 
waste and protect the integrity of American political institutions.17
Despite this interest, however, prosecutions for FCPA violations have 
been lax until recently.18
Since 2004, the U.S. government has devoted vast resources toward 
prosecuting FCPA violations.19  The Fifth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Kay20 precipitated the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) renewed 
focus on curtailing the corporate payment of bribes.21  Specifically, 
Kay’s broad interpretation of the business nexus requirement—a 
provision in the FCPA that requires a connection between the bribery 
payment and its anticipated effect22—paved the way for prosecutors to 
indict companies based on payments that directly or indirectly “obtain or 
2010/crm-speech-101116.html (“[B]ribery in international business transactions weakens economic 
development, . . . undermines confidence in the marketplace, and . . . distorts competition.”). 
16 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that the purpose of the Act is 
to prohibit corrupt business practices because they run counter to the “moral expectations and values 
of the American public”). 
17 See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977) (Conf. Rep.). 
18 Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 256 (1997); see also Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA 
Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2008) (stating that before 
2000, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) averaged 
only three FCPA prosecutions per year); GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2011 YEAR-END FCPA
UPDATE (Jan. 3, 2012), available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/ 
2011YearEndFCPAUpdate.aspx (noting that 2010 and 2011 have been the most prolific years for 
FCPA enforcement with seventy-four actions in 2010 and forty-eight in 2011); GIBSON, DUNN &
CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 MID-YEAR FCPA UPDATE (July 8, 2010), available at 
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx (noting that since 2000, 
FCPA enforcement has been trending upward, with thirty-eight actions brought in 2007, thirty-three 
in 2008, and forty in 2009). 
19 Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, Address at the Annual Meeting of the 
Washington Metropolitan Area Corporate Counsel Association (Jan. 26, 2011), available at 
www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-110126.html (stating that the Fraud Section 
of the Department of Justice has hired a number of experienced prosecutors devoted solely to 
combat bribery, and has implemented changes that have significantly increased FCPA enforcement); 
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Address at the American Bar Association White Collar 
Crime Conference (Mar. 1, 2007), available at www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2007/ 
ag_speech_070301.html (“The Department [of Justice] has substantially increased its focus and 
attention on [FCPA violations.]”). 
20 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). 
21 See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 921 (2010) 
(“[T]he [Kay] decision clearly energized the enforcement agencies and post-Kay there has been an 
explosion in FCPA enforcement actions . . . .”). 
22 Kay, 359 F.3d at 744. 
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retain business.”23  In light of increased FCPA enforcement, the scarcity 
of legislative history and judicial scrutiny regarding the business nexus 
requirement has effectively conferred ultimate discretionary authority on 
the DOJ and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
determine the nexus’s scope.24
Accordingly, the lack of legislative and judicial guidance has given 
rise to a climate of apprehension and fear for American businesses.25
Corporate compliance with the FCPA is difficult, given the ambiguous 
nature of the statute, yet the legislature and courts have nonetheless 
failed to clearly define what conduct is prohibited by the statute.26  As a 
result, U.S. businesses are left to fill in the gaps.27  Ultimately, risk-
averse companies have been forced into an environment where 
heightened levels of risk and over-compliance have led to the formation 
of intricate and expensive corporate compliance programs.28
This Comment therefore argues that the broad interpretation of the 
FCPA’s business nexus requirement, which criminalizes payments that 
both directly and indirectly “obtain or retain business,” encourages 
prosecutorial abuse and deviates from the intended purpose of the Act.  
The Justice Department’s expansive approach to FCPA enforcement has 
cost companies tremendously,29 even though the Act’s drafters intended 
for a more balanced approach.30  Part I of this Comment will discuss the 
history and background of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and 
its amendments in 1988 and 1998.  Part II will examine the application of 
the business nexus requirement in United States v. Kay31 and argue that 
23 See id. at 755. 
24 See Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 918 (stating that 
the DOJ and SEC aggressively interpret the business nexus requirement). 
25 See Sarah Johnson, Deal-Breaker: Fear of the FCPA, CFO.COM (Feb. 15, 2011), 
www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14555334 (stating that businesses have become “wary of the potential 
business partner’s lack of transparency, payment structures in contracts, or relationships between its 
executives and government officials or third parties”). 
26 Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010,
12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 101-03 (2010). 
27 See id. at 103 (noting that during the first decade of enforcement, the ambiguity of the 
statute had dissuaded companies from venturing overseas to do business).  Since then, the business 
nexus requirement has still never been defined, and the FCPA has never been amended to clarify this 
term.  See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (Westlaw 2012). 
28 See Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 1001. 
29 Id. at 1001-02 (stating that risk-averse companies that seek to do business in foreign 
markets feel compelled to implement costly and unnecessary FCPA compliance programs only to 
appease prosecutors and to avoid formal charges ex ante).
30 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (creating the “facilitating payments” 
exception to ensure that despite the prohibition on corrupt payments, companies would still be able 
to make payments to receive favorable treatment from low-level officials). 
31 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). 
5
Georgis: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
248 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
its interpretation is inconsistent with the FCPA’s purpose.  Part III will 
examine enforcement measures used by the DOJ and the SEC in a post-
Kay world.  Finally, Part IV will propose that judicial intervention in 
these enforcement measures is necessary to alleviate some of the 
challenges that currently exist, as well as to guide companies in 
distinguishing lawful from unlawful conduct. 
I. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
President Jimmy Carter signed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
into law in 1977,32 making the United States the first country to outlaw 
the payment of bribes to foreign officials.33  The political will of 
Congress had shifted toward reining in these unethical activities.34  In 
essence, federal legislators sought to prohibit the type of bribery that 
influences public officials to abuse their discretionary authority and 
disrupts market efficiency and foreign relations.35  To better understand 
the drafters’ intent, this Comment will discuss the origins of the FCPA, 
its subsequent amendments, and the business nexus requirement. 
32 See Jimmy Carter, Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill: Statement on 
Signing S. 305 into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2157 (Dec. 20, 1977), available at
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7036 (“[B]ribery is ethically repugnant and 
competitively unnecessary.  Corrupt practices between corporations and public officials overseas 
undermine the integrity and stability of governments and harm our relations with other countries.  
Recent revelations of widespread overseas bribery have eroded public confidence in our basic 
institutions.”).
33 Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 230 (1997) (stating that the United States is the first 
country to criminalize the extraterritorial payments of bribes by domestic companies).  It took almost 
twenty years before other countries enacted their own anti-bribery statutes.  In 1997, thirty-eight 
countries signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, including most European Union countries, 
Canada, and the United States.  See ORG. OF ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD CONVENTION ON 
COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS:
RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF 24 NOVEMBER 2005, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/ 
13/40272933.pdf (listing ratifying countries). 
34 Once the SEC and IRS investigations uncovered the questionable payments, Congress 
spent the next two and half years hearing testimony and considering House and Senate versions of 
the proposed bill. See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 
913 (2010). 
35 Kay, 359 F.3d at 747 & n.33 (citing Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1029 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (stating that the “FCPA was primarily designed to protect the integrity of American 
foreign policy and domestic markets”)). 
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A.  ORIGINS OF THE ACT
The FCPA was enacted as a response to rampant unethical corporate 
conduct occurring during the 1970s.36  Based on a number of corporate 
corruption scandals discovered during the Watergate era, the SEC 
conducted multiple investigations to assess how widespread the misuse 
of corporate funds had become.37  As a result of these investigations, the 
SEC and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uncovered several “slush 
funds”38 used by U.S. multinational corporations for the purpose of 
bribing foreign government officials to obtain lucrative business 
agreements.39  Congress was troubled by these exchanges because they 
were harmful to the U.S. economy while, at the same time, permissible 
under federal law.40  Members of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs concurred with then-Treasury Secretary W. 
Michael Blumenthal’s position that “paying bribes—apart from being 
morally repugnant and illegal in most countries—is simply not necessary 
for the successful conduct of business here or overseas.”41  The 
36 Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 239. 
37 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND 
URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE 
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (May 12, 1976); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1-2 (1977) (Conf. Rep.). 
38 A “slush fund” is defined as “a fund for bribing public officials” or “an unregulated fund 
often used for illicit purposes.”  Slush Fund Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/slush%20fund (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). 
39 See UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM.
ON CONSUMER PROT. & FIN. OF THE H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95th Cong. 
1-184 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that SEC report revealed that 
over 300 U.S. companies made questionable payments to foreign officials involving hundreds of 
millions of dollars); S. REP. NO. 95-114 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (revealing that U.S. oil companies and 
defense contractors made large payments to high-ranking government officials in Japan, 
Netherlands, and Italy); see also Scandals: A Record of Corporate Corruption, TIME, Feb. 23, 1976, 
available at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,918067-1,00.html (stating that the SEC 
and IRS have exposed voluminous bribes, kickbacks, and political payoffs involving Northrop 
Corp., Gulf Oil, 3M Co., Exxon, General Motors, and IBM).  In many countries, the idea of making 
cash gifts in exchange for government contracts is ingrained in the business culture.  Barbara 
Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global 
Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts Toward 
the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5 (1999).  The industries 
typically involved in these illicit payments were health care, oil and gas production, food products, 
aerospace, airlines and air services, and chemicals.  UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 
1977: H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95th Cong. 1-184 (1977). 
40 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 
(1977) (Conf. Rep.). 
41 S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7
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committee based its agreement with Secretary Blumenthal on the 
following:
Many U.S. firms have taken a strong stand against paying foreign 
bribes and are still able to compete in international trade.  
Unfortunately, the reputation and image of all U.S. businessmen has 
been tarnished by the activities of a sizeable number, but by no means 
a majority of American firms.  A strong antibribery law is urgently 
needed to bring these corrupt practices to a halt and to restore public 
confidence in the integrity of the American business system.42
Accordingly, Congress took a bold stance to criminalize behavior it 
deemed unethical, regardless of the customs and routine practices of the 
foreign country where business took place.43
42 Id.
43 UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
CONSUMER PROT. & FIN. OF THE H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95th Cong. 1-
184 (1977) (“The payment of bribes to influence the acts or decisions of foreign officials, foreign 
political parties or candidates for foreign political office is unethical.  It is counter to the moral 
expectations and values of the American public.”).  Transparency International, a German-based 
global corruption watchdog group, conducts a global opinion poll aimed at gauging how exposed 
respondents’ lives are to a culture of official graft.  See 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index,
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 22, 2008), www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/ 
2008/cpi2008.  In Korea, a culture of bribery is deeply ingrained in the business community.  See
Yoolim Lee, Samsung Bribery Probe Points to Pattern of Graft in South Korea, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 
17, 2008, 5:52 PM), www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid= 
aH3aDwXXnvqc.  Many label the system as “crony capitalism” and argue that Korea is 
fundamentally corrupt.  Id.  Although illegal, bribery in Korea is socially acceptable and often the 
preferred means of conducting business.  Id.  The same holds true for Albania, Greece, and Japan.  
See Tom Zeller Jr., If You’re Thinking of Living in Albania . . . Bring Bribe Money, N.Y. TIMES 
BLOG (Dec. 7, 2006 9:17 AM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/if-youre-thinking-of-
living-in-albania-bring-bribe-money/?scp=4&sq=global%20culture%20of%20bribery&st=cse.  
Basic services in Albania, such as electricity, even require the payment of a small bribe.  Id.  In 
Greece, a deep reputation of corruption costs Greek citizens $1 billion per year.  Near-Bankrupt 
Greece a Culture of Corruption; $1 Billion a Year in Bribes, NEW EUROPE (Mar. 7, 2010), 
www.neurope.eu/articles/99469.php.  Many civil servants, doctors, and lawyers have been found to 
evade taxes through the payment of bribes.  Id.  In Japan, the practice of “Amakudari” runs rampant.  
See Hiroko Nakata, “Amakudari” Crackdown Called Toothless, Poll Ploy, THE JAPAN TIMES 
ONLINE (Apr. 14, 2007), http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070414a3.html.  “Amakudari” is 
the institutionalized practice under which Japanese bureaucrats retire to high-paying public or 
private sector positions. Id.  The costly corruption fostered in this system allows politicians and 
companies to collude on business agreements, ultimately favorable to the politician once hired.  Id.
Despite enactment of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law (UCPL), which criminalizes the 
bribery of foreign officials, this unethical business practice still occurs.  See Tetsuya Morimoto, 
OECD Criticized Japan for its Laxness in Implementing the Anti-Bribery Convention, 21 INT’L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 249 (2005).  A March 2005 OECD Report that evaluated Japan’s 
implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention found that Japan had not made sufficient 
efforts to enforce the prohibition against bribing public officials.  Id.  The lack of investigative and 
8
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However, Congress created an exception to prevent U.S. companies 
from being disadvantaged where insignificant monetary payments were a 
social norm.44  The “facilitating payments” exception permitted 
payments to officials whose duties were considered “clerical” or 
“ministerial.”45  This provision was created under the assumption that 
low-level government positions entailed little discretion and that 
payments to them were harmless.46  These payments allowed U.S. 
companies to adapt to the cultural norms of the foreign country.47
Unfortunately, Congress left the terms “clerical” and “ministerial” 
undefined, and American businesses were forced to draw their own line 
as to how much discretion a government employee needed before falling 
outside the exception.48  After a decade of confusion surrounding the 
vague and undefined terms of the Act, Congress provided pivotal 
guidance through subsequent amendments.49
B. THE 1988 AND 1998 AMENDMENTS TO THE FCPA
The government’s lack of enforcement yielded criticism by many 
who later called for clarification and changes to the FCPA.50  The 
growing trade deficit in the United States caused concern among 
members of Congress, so modifications to the Act were made in an 
prosecutorial resources being devoted to enforcing the UCPL has resulted in no formal 
investigations or charges against Japanese corporations. Id.
44 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2 (Westlaw 
2012)).
45 Id.  The “facilitating payments” exception was imbedded in the definition of “foreign 
official.” Id.  The term “foreign official” was defined as “any officer or employee of a foreign 
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official 
capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality.  Such 
term does not include any employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or 
instrumentality thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
46 Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 242 (1997) (stating that illicit payments became a part 
of the pay that low-level government employees received because their salaries alone were 
inadequate).
47 Id. at 266. 
48 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982).  The only guidance given from the legislature came 
from a House Report that distinguished corrupt payments from facilitating payments.  See
UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977: H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN 
COMMERCE, 95th Cong. 1-184 (1977).  For instance, the bill would not proscribe gratuity payments 
to customs officials to speed processing and secure permits or licenses.  Id.
49 Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 243. 
50 Id.
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attempt to eliminate export obstacles facing U.S. companies.51
Consequently, the FCPA was amended twice, once under the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 198852 and again under the 
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998.53
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act was Congress’s initial 
attempt to resolve the harsh economic effects of the FCPA.54  The 
principles behind the 1988 amendments were to promote the 
participation of U.S. corporations in international trade, to prevent FCPA 
violations in international business transactions, and to send a 
congressional signal to the executive branch that foreign nations should 
also enact anti-corruption laws.55  To effectuate these principles, 
Congress amended and clarified the terms of the FCPA.56  One of these 
amendments altered the scienter requirement for payments made to third 
parties.57  The 1977 version of the FCPA prohibited payments to third 
parties that the payor actually knew or had reason to know were for 
purposes proscribed by the Act.58  Because legislators did not want to 
impose criminal liability for simple negligence or to encourage the 
willful blindness of corrupt third-party payments, Congress sought to 
amend the state-of-mind requirement.59  As a result, the 1988 version of 
the Act criminalizes the payment of third-party bribes only if the payor 
51 Id.
52 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (1994)) (enacting the 1988 amendments negotiated between 
the House and the Senate). 
53 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 
Stat. 3302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2000)). 
54 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 
1107. 
55 Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010,
12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 98 (2010).  The 1988 amendment recommended that the executive 
branch promote global adherence to FCPA policies and request the cooperation of the OECD in 
adopting U.S. anti-corruption standards.  Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 248. 
56 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107. 
57 H.R. REP. NO.100-576, at 919 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 
1952. 
58 Id.; see also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 
Stat. 1107.  The original language of the FCPA included both a subjective and objective mens rea 
requirement for a third-party bribe.  Id.  If the company knew or had reason to know that the 
payment made to a third-party would be used for purposes of official graft, a violation occurred.  Id.
59 H.R. REP. NO.100-576, at 919 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 
1952; Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107. 
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has actual knowledge of the intended results or acts with a conscious 
disregard for the truth.60
In addition to this amendment, Congress clarified the “facilitating 
payments” exception by setting forth what constitutes an “essentially 
ministerial or clerical” duty61 and added two more defenses to shield 
corporations from liability.62  The Conference Report explained that the 
exception applies to “routine governmental action,” defined as 
“ordinarily and commonly performed” duties.63  The 1988 amendment 
provided a set of specific examples regarding payments for “routine 
governmental action,” including the processing of government papers, 
loading and unloading cargo, and scheduling inspections associated with 
contract performance.64  Moreover, Congress created two affirmative 
defenses to liability for what would otherwise be illicit payments: 
reasonable and bona fide expenditures,65 and legality in the host 
60 H.R. REP. NO.100-576, at 919-21 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1547, 1952.  The conferees clarified the conscious-disregard standard as the “deliberate ignorance of 
known circumstances that should reasonably alert one to the high probability of violations of the 
Act.” Id.; see also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 
1107. Contra Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 244 (contrasting the 1977 scienter requirement, which 
required the payor to know or have reason to know that the payments were for the purpose of 
influencing or inducing foreign officials to act). 
61 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 
1107.  The exception for routine governmental action stated that “[15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)] shall not 
apply to any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official 
the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by 
a foreign official, political party, or party official.”  15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) 
(Westlaw 2012). 
62 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 
1107. 
63 See id. The conferees make clear that “‘ordinarily and commonly performed’ actions with 
respect to permits or licenses would not include those governmental approvals involving an exercise 
of discretion by a government official where the actions are the functional equivalent of ‘obtaining 
or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.’”  H.R. REP. NO.100-576, at 
921 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
2(h)(4)(B) (1994). 
64 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.  In 
the 1988 amendment, Congress made explicitly clear what “routine governmental action” did not 
include.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B) (1994).  “[T]he term ‘routine governmental action’ means 
only an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in: (i) obtaining 
permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; 
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection, 
mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or 
inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone service, power and water 
supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from 
deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature.”  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A) (1994). 
65 The “reasonable and bona fide expenditures” defense applies to travel and lodging 
expenses associated with the promoting, demonstrating, and explaining of products or services.  
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country.66  These defenses were Congress’s attempt to balance a resolute 
opposition to global corporate bribery with the promotion of U.S. 
economic interests abroad.67
A decade after the 1988 amendment, Congress amended the FCPA 
a second time.68  With the encouragement of President Clinton,69 the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions.70  Thirty-three member 
countries—including the United States—signed the Convention, thereby 
agreeing to enact legislation in their respective countries that prohibits 
the bribery of foreign officials.71  In October 1998, Congress 
consequently amended federal law to conform to international standards 
promulgated by the OECD Convention.72
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107; 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 78dd-1(c), 78dd-2(c), 78dd-3(c) (Westlaw 2012). 
66 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.  
The legality defense permits a U.S. company to make payments to a foreign official only if the 
payments are lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign official’s country.  Id.; 15 
U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(c), 78dd-2(c), 78dd-3(c). 
67 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 
1107 (stating that congressional findings and conclusions include an unnecessary concern by U.S. 
companies regarding the scope of the FCPA, and that the principal objectives of the FCPA should be 
maintained). 
68 See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 
112 Stat. 3302. 
69 The 1988 Amendment to the FCPA charged the U.S. President with pursuing the 
negotiation of an international agreement to govern corporate bribery.  See Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107. 
70 See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, OECD, www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2017813 
_1_1_1_1,00&&en-USS_01DBC.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2012). 
71 See William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair 
Competition Act of 1998 (Nov. 10, 1998), available at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
index.php?pid=55254&st=&st1=.  As of March 2011, thirty-four OECD countries had signed the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.  These countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Chile, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Israel, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States, and four non-OECD countries (Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Bulgaria).  See
ORG. OF ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF 
MARCH 2009, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf. 
72 See International Anti-Bribery Act of 1998, S. 2375, 105th Cong. § 2 (as passed by House, 
Oct. 9, 1998); Id., S. 2375, 105th Cong. § 2 (as passed by Senate, July 31, 1998). 
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The 1998 amendment expanded the FCPA’s substantive and 
jurisdictional scope.73  First, Congress broadened the meaning of bribery 
to include illicit payments that secure “any improper advantage.”74
Unlike the prior language of the provision (“influencing [or inducing] 
any act or decision of [a] foreign official”75), the new language is much 
broader and focuses on the competitive advantage gained, not on the 
payor’s intention to influence the official.76  Second, the 1998 
amendment expanded the FCPA’s jurisdiction beyond U.S. borders to 
allow for greater enforcement.77  The alternative jurisdiction provision 
functions as a global enforcement mechanism that permits the U.S. 
government to prosecute any U.S. national who violates the FCPA, even 
if the acts are committed while outside the United States.78  These 
expansions of power subject even more corporate payments to FCPA 
enforcement, despite harsh criticism that the statute is vague.79
After much debate and years of congressional testimony aimed at 
clarifying and redefining the scope of the Act, the law consists of two 
main kinds of provisions: (1) accounting provisions,80 and (2) antibribery 
provisions.81  First, the accounting provisions, commonly known as the 
“books and records and internal control provisions,”82 require a publicly 
73 Compare International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
366, 112 Stat. 3302, and 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (Westlaw 2012), with Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, and 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B) 
(1994). 
74 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 
Stat. 3302. 
75 “It shall be unlawful . . . [to give] anything of value to any foreign official for purposes of 
(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, [or] (ii) inducing 
such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official.”  15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(A) (1994). 
76 See Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid 
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 448 (2010).  The definition of 
“foreign official” was also broadened to include “persons employed by international organizations.”  
Id.; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(h)(2) (Westlaw 2012). 
77 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i) (Westlaw 2012). 
78 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i); Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A 
Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. at 448. 
79 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 
1107 (recognizing the complaints by U.S. corporations that the FCPA is vague). 
80 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(A), (B) (Westlaw 2012).  The accounting provisions were 
intended to detect illicit payments through the disclosure of accurate company records.  Barbara 
Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global 
Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts Toward 
the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5 (1999). 
81 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (Westlaw 2012). 
82 The books and records and internal controls provisions apply only to entities with 
registered classes of securities under securities laws.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(A), (B).  These 
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traded corporation to maintain books and records that “accurately and 
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the 
[corporation].”83  These stringent accounting controls apply only to 
entities with registered classes of securities pursuant to federal securities 
laws.84  Second, the antibribery provisions85—the operative portions of 
the FCPA—prohibit corporations from acquiring foreign business 
through under-the-table deals.86  Because these provisions help federal 
agencies collect millions in criminal and civil penalties,87 and effectively 
force U.S. businesses to adopt intricate compliance programs,88 this 
Comment will discuss the antibribery provisions in further detail below. 
C. ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS AND THE BUSINESS NEXUS
REQUIREMENT
The antibribery provisions of the FCPA, intended as the primary 
enforcement measure in prohibiting foreign bribery,89 apply to three 
groups of actors: (1) issuers, (2) domestic concerns, and (3) any person 
who acts in furtherance of the bribery payment while on U.S. territory.90
First, issuers are both U.S. companies that have securities registered in 
the United States, and foreign businesses91 with shares listed on a U.S. 
entities are publicly held companies with shares that trade on U.S. exchanges.  Id.  The SEC can 
impose only civil penalties on a U.S. company unless the company knowingly fails to implement a 
system of internal accounting controls.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(4), (5) (Westlaw 2012). 
83 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(A). 
84 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(A), (B).  A publicly held corporation must comply with the 
accounting provisions if it has securities registered with the SEC under section 12 of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 or is required to file periodic reports under section 15(d) of the same Act.  
Id.; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(d) (Westlaw 2012).  The SEC is responsible for enforcing the books and 
records and internal control provisions.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(a), (b) (Westlaw 2012). 
85 In contrast to the accounting controls, the antibribery provisions apply to U.S. companies 
(both public and private), U.S. citizens, and any person while in a U.S. territory.  See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 
78m(b), 78dd-1 to -3 (Westlaw 2012).  The DOJ and SEC enforce the antibribery provisions through 
the use of criminal and civil penalties.  Id.
86 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (Westlaw 2012). 
87 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Magyar Telekom and Deutsche Telekom 
Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay Nearly $64 Million in 
Combined Criminal Penalties (Dec. 29, 2011), available at www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ 
cases/magyar-telekom/2011-12-29-mt-dt-press-release.pdf (stating that the federal government 
recovered more than $95 million in a parallel enforcement action with the SEC). 
88 See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 1001-02 
(2010). 
89 See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 
4107-08. 
90 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to -3. 
91 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for 
Engaging in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
14
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stock exchange in the form of American Depository Receipts.92  Second, 
domestic concerns are defined as U.S. citizens or companies 
incorporated in the United States.93  Third, Congress expanded the FCPA 
to cover “any person,” usually a foreign national, over whom the DOJ 
has jurisdiction.94  Enforcement actions against issuers and domestic 
concerns are more common than actions against foreign nationals.95
Consequently, when this Comment mentions “actors” it will refer 
collectively to issuers and domestic concerns. 
The FCPA’s antibribery provisions bind issuers and domestic 
concerns even if they act outside the United States.96  These actors are 
prohibited from (i) corruptly97 making use of interstate commerce in 
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of a 
monetary payment, or anything of value (ii) to a foreign official or 
foreign political party (iii) in order to “obtain or retain business.”98
Congress intended the FCPA to be an expansive criminal law, 
prohibiting both the actual payment of bribes by corporations and their 
agents, as well as attempts to make such bribes.99  Additionally, the 
294.htm (charging Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, a German-based manufacturer, with violating the 
FCPA and ordering it to pay $800 million in criminal and civil penalties). 
92 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78l, 78o(d) (Westlaw 2012); 17 C.F.R. § 239.36 (Westlaw 
2012). 
93 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (Westlaw 2012). 
94 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-3(f)(1) (Westlaw 2012).  Any foreign national in the United States 
who commits an act in furtherance of a bribe is subject to DOJ and SEC enforcement.  Matthew J. 
Kovacich, Comment, Backyard Business Going Global: The Consequences of Increased 
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) on Minnesota and Wisconsin, 32 
HAMLINE L. REV. 529, 536-37 (2009).  U.S. courts have jurisdiction over foreign companies or 
persons who make these illegal payments in the United States, even though they are not domiciled in 
the United States and do not maintain any place of business in the United States.  Wynn Pakdeejit & 
Timothy Breier, Continued FCPA Enforcement Sends Clear Message Around the Globe, THE 
NATION (Sept. 14, 2010), available at www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/09/14/ 
opinion/Continued-FCPA-enforcement-sends-clear-message-aro-30137919.html.  The FCPA defines 
the term “person” as “any natural person other than a national of the United States . . . or any 
corporation . . . organized under the law of a foreign nation or a political subdivision thereof.”  15 
U.S.C.A. § 78dd-3(f)(1). 
95 See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE (Jan. 3, 2011), 
available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx.  A 
summary of the largest FCPA settlements in history shows that nine out of the ten corporations were 
considered “issuers” with shares registered with the SEC or trading on an exchange as an American 
Depository Receipt. 
96 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-2(i)(1), (2) (Westlaw 2012). 
97 The legislative history of the FCPA describes the term “corruptly” in order to make clear 
that “the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his 
official position in order to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client.”  S. REP. NO. 95-
114, at 10 (1977) (Conf. Rep.). 
98 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (Westlaw 2012). 
99 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a). 
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statute prohibits any person from using a third party or intermediary to 
consummate the exchange.100
A successful prosecution under the FCPA requires the DOJ to prove 
three core elements.101  First, the term “anything of value” has been 
interpreted to encompass both tangible and intangible benefits to the 
individual receiving the value.102  Second, a “foreign official” is any 
officer or employee of a foreign government or public international 
organization.103  Third, the term “to obtain or retain business”—
commonly referred to as the “business nexus requirement”—directs the 
government to prove that the illegal payments will assist the company in 
acquiring or keeping business.104  Strictly speaking, “anything of value” 
corruptly offered to any “foreign official” must be for one of the 
following purposes: 
[1] influencing any act or decision of [the] foreign official in his 
official capacity; [2] inducing [the] foreign official to do or omit to do 
any act in violation of [his] lawful duty . . . ; [3] inducing [the] foreign 
official to use his influence with a foreign government . . . to affect or 
influence any act or decision of such government . . . ; or [4] securing 
100 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3) (Westlaw 2012) (prohibiting 
payment to “any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be 
offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political 
party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office”). 
101 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a). 
102 See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 914-16 
(2010).  Congress has not established a minimum value for this element.  Id.  DOJ enforcement has 
ranged from the most egregious cases to the most subtle.  In an action against Kellogg Brown & 
Root LLC (KBR), corporate officials provided cash-stuffed briefcases or cash-stuffed vehicles to 
various Nigerian foreign officials.  Id.  On the other hand, in an enforcement action brought against 
Paradigm B.V., the DOJ considered a “thing of value” as providing employment to a client’s 
brother, and leasing a house owned by the client’s wife.  Paradigm B.V. Agrees to Pay Penalty to 
Resolve Foreign Bribery Issues in Multiple Countries, FCPA ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 2, 2007), 
www.fcpaenforcement.com/documents/document_detail.asp?ID=4459&PAGE=2. 
103 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), (B) (Westlaw 2012).  This element is the source of 
much criticism of the FCPA.  The lack of judicial scrutiny has permitted the DOJ to apply the FCPA 
when employees of state-owned corporations receive payments.  AGA Medical was forced to pay a 
criminal penalty when it made payments to doctors at state-owned hospitals for purchasing AGA 
products.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, AGA Medical Corporation Agrees to Pay $2 Million 
Penalty and Enter Deferred Prosecution Agreement for FCPA Violations (June 3, 2008), available at
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-crm-491.html. 
104 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Stacy Williams, Grey 
Areas of FCPA Compliance, 17 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 14, 17 (2008). 
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any improper advantage, in order to assist [the payor] in obtaining or 
retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.105
The connection or “linkage” between the anticipated effects that flow 
from these purposes and the payment provided in completion or 
expectation of such effects functions as the “nexus” that is at the heart of 
the “to obtain or retain business” element.106
Although these elements are most important, critics have argued 
that they are among the most ambiguous.107  This issue reached the 
courts in 2004 when, after applying the principles of statutory 
construction, the Fifth Circuit held that the FCPA is ambiguous as a 
matter of law and fails to clearly define the scope of the business nexus 
requirement.108  Congress’s failure to define the business nexus 
requirement has forced companies to attempt compliance with an 
amorphous prohibition.109  Nonetheless, little guidance has been given as 
to the reach of the nexus,110 and such uncertainty continues to increase 
transaction costs for U.S. companies wishing to conduct business 
abroad.111  Many would agree that the most basic form of bribery—a 
105 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), 78dd-2(a)(1), 78dd-3(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012) (emphasis 
added).
106 Kay, 359 F.3d at 744. 
107 See Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 916-18; Jeffrey L. 
Snyder, International Operations: Managing the Risks, N.Y. L.J., May 20, 1996, available at 
www.crowell.com/documents/DOCASSOCFKTYPE_ARTICLES_677.pdf; Mike Koehler, The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV.
389, 390-93 (2010). 
108 Kay, 359 F.3d at 746 (holding that the statutory language is amenable to more than one 
interpretation).
109 See Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 907-10 (noting the 
lack of FCPA case law); see also 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(f), 78dd-2(h), 78dd-3(f) (Westlaw 2012) 
(omitting “to obtain or retain business” from defined terms). 
110 See, e.g., Stacy Williams, Grey Areas of FCPA Compliance, 17 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE 
L.J. 14, 17-18 (2008); Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 917-18. 
111 See Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 137, 155 (2010) (“Statutory clarity is essential to factoring the costs associated with 
investment decisions by enabling corporations to accurately consider the costs of complying with the 
law.”).  For companies wishing to engage in a merger or acquisition, the ambiguity in the FCPA may 
have dire consequences for the deal.  See Jeffrey L. Snyder, International Operations: Managing the 
Risks, N.Y. L.J., May 20, 1996, www.crowell.com/documents/ 
DOCASSOCFKTYPE_ARTICLES_677.pdf.  Limiting potential liability demands an increased 
scrutiny in premerger due diligence, which entails digging through many of the target company’s 
records. Id.  If a potential problem appears to be within the purview of the FCPA, the acquiring 
company may offset the transaction price.  Id.  This imposes a considerable cost on the target 
company.  See id.
17
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suitcase full of cash in exchange for lucrative government contracts112—
would undoubtedly be in violation of the FCPA.113  On the other hand, 
some have engaged in business transactions not as blatant as the above 
example, yet equally punishable in the eyes of the law.114  Business’s 
inability to interpret the scope of the nexus has caused much 
confusion;115 yet, there appears to be little judicial scrutiny to clear the 
air.116
Given the lack of case law defining the FCPA’s business nexus 
requirement, issuers and domestic concerns are faced with the difficult 
task of formulating their own interpretation.  The scant guidance from 
the 1988 and 1998 amendments to the FCPA provide no refuge to those 
seeking to avoid liability.117  Since Congress’s adoption of the Act in 
1977, the business nexus requirement has been one of the few provisions 
subjected to limited judicial scrutiny.118  However, in the past decade, the 
issues confronting corporate officials have only been inflamed.119
112 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Willbros Group and 
Former Employees with Foreign Bribery (May 14, 2008), available at
www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-86.htm (charging Willbros Group for violating the FCPA when 
it allegedly engaged in a scheme to pay $6 million in bribes to the Nigerian government in exchange 
for two significant contracts worth $9 million). 
113 United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Information at 12-13, 
United States v. BAE Systems plc, No. 10-CR-00035 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2010) (alleging that BAE 
wired $9 million to a Swiss bank account with a high degree of awareness that the money would 
ultimately be transferred to Saudi Arabian government officials in exchange for their purchase of 
military jets); Information at 18, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. 09-CR-00071 
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2009) (alleging that $500,000 in cash was put into a vehicle and left in a hotel 
parking lot for Nigerian government officials to pick up). 
114 See John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 18, 2007), 
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battling_bribery_abroad/ (opining that most bribery attempts 
are subtle and difficult to detect). 
115 See Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 1002 (“When the 
statute with uncertain terms and defenses is a criminal statute, such as the FCPA, the risk of over-
compliance is greatest.”). 
116 Id. at 909-10. 
117 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(f), 78dd-2(h), 78dd-3(f) (Westlaw 2012).  The amendments to 
the FCPA failed to provide any definition or guidance as to what the business nexus requirement 
means.  See id.
118 Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 918. 
119 See Stacy Williams, Grey Areas of FCPA Compliance, 17 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 
14, 18 (2008) (stating that since the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kay, the DOJ has used a broad 
reading of the business nexus requirement); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text (FCPA 
enforcement has been trending upward since Kay).
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss2/5
2012] The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 261 
II.  A BROADENING OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S AUTHORITY TO 
PROSECUTE FCPA VIOLATIONS
In 2004, the seminal case addressing the vagueness of the business 
nexus requirement came before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit.120  In United States v. Kay, the court considered whether 
payments made to Haitian government customs officials for the purpose 
of reducing import duties fell within the scope of this element.121  The 
Fifth Circuit held that making payments to a foreign government customs 
official to reduce taxes and customs duties can provide an unfair 
advantage to the business and thereby assist in “obtaining or retaining 
business.”122
A. UNITED STATES V. KAY
In Kay, the federal government charged two corporate executives 
from American Rice, Inc. (ARI) with bribing customs officials in 
Haiti.123  ARI was a publicly held company that exported rice to foreign 
countries, including Haiti.124  Standard importation procedures in Haiti 
required customs officials to assess import duties based on the quantity 
and value of rice brought into the country.125  Additionally, Haiti 
required rice importers to pay an advance deposit against Haitian sales 
taxes, for which credit would be given when tax returns were filed.126
In 1999, David Kay, ARI’s vice president of Caribbean Operations, 
disclosed in an interview with outside counsel that ARI had taken steps 
to reduce its tax liability to the Haitian government.127  These steps 
included underreporting ARI’s imports and paying Haitian officials to 
accept false documentation that intentionally understated the amount of 
120 See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). 
121 Id. at 740.  The issue presented in Kay was in contrast to the common FCPA scenario, 
where a U.S. company would make payments to a “foreign official” in exchange for a government 
contract.  Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 918. 
122 Kay, 359 F.3d at 756. 
123 Id. at 740. 
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Michael J. Gilbert & William Gibson, “Kay III” Highlights Reach of FCPA to Payments 
Abroad, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 24, 2007, at 4, available at www.dechert.com/library/Gilbert% 
20and%20Gibson%2012-2407%20Kay%20III%20Highlights.pdf. 
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rice shipped to Haiti.128  Kay explained that this was part of the cost of 
doing business in that country.129
After later self-disclosing the payments to the U.S. government, 
Kay and Douglas Murphy, ARI’s president, were indicted and charged 
with violating the FCPA.130  The U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and held that 
there was an insufficient nexus between the payments and a specific 
contract.131  Therefore, the court reasoned, the payments to reduce ARI’s 
tax liability were outside the scope of the FCPA’s “obtain or retain 
business” provision.132  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held 
that, in addition to payments that directly influenced a government 
contract, Congress intended to proscribe a much broader range of 
payments.133  Based on legislative history, the court of appeals ruled that 
Congress intended to extend criminal liability to instances where bribes 
provide a competitive advantage.134
As a result of Kay, the DOJ and the SEC are aggressively enforcing 
the FCPA.135  There has been a dramatic increase in prosecutions 
involving customs duties and tax payments, or other payments intended 
to assist the company in securing government licenses, permits, and 
128 Kay, 359 F.3d at 741. 
129 Gilbert & Gibson, “Kay III” Highlights Reach of FCPA to Payments Abroad, N.Y. L.J., 
Dec. 24, 2007, at 4. 
130 Id.
131 United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684, 686 (S.D. Tex. 2002), rev’d, 359 F.3d 738 
(5th Cir. 2004). 
132 Id.
133 Kay, 359 F.3d at 755-56. 
134 Id. at 756. 
135 See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE (Jan. 3, 2011), 
available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx; News and 
Its Critics: A Tabloid’s Excesses Don’t Tarnish Thousands of Other Journalists, WALL ST. J., July 
18, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303661904576451812776293184.html? 
mod=djkeyword (“The foreign-bribery law has historically been enforced against companies 
attempting to obtain or retain government business.  But U.S. officials have been attempting to 
extend their enforcement to include any payments that have nothing to do with foreign government 
procurement.  This includes [the] case [United States v. Kay.]”); Mike Koehler, Archive for the 
“U.S. v. Kay” Category, FCPA PROFESSOR, July 19, 2011, www.fcpaprofessor.com/category/u-s-v-
kay (“During the FCPA’s first 20 years, every FCPA enforcement action concerned allegations that 
payments to a ‘foreign official’ assisted the payor in ‘obtaining or retaining business’ with a foreign 
government or alleged foreign government ‘department, agency, or instrumentality.’  FCPA 
enforcement then changed—most notably with the U.S. v. Kay prosecution.”).  FCPA enforcement 
actions in 2010 rose 85% over actions in 2009.  GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END
FCPA UPDATE (Jan. 3, 2011), available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Year-
EndFCPAUpdate.aspx.  Many of the investigations and prosecutions in 2010 involved multiple 
defendant cases with industry-wide bribery.  Id.  As a result, the DOJ brought forty-eight actions and 
recovered more than $1 billion in penalties.  Id.
20
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certifications.136  However, the Fifth Circuit’s broadening of the business 
nexus requirement contravenes Congress’s attempt to carefully balance 
the ban of foreign bribery payments with a corporation’s ability to 
remain competitive in the global market. 
B. THE KAY INTERPRETATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FCPA’S
PURPOSE
The majority of the Kay opinion focused on congressional intent at 
the time the bribery law was drafted.137  The Fifth Circuit agreed with the 
district court that, because the statutory provisions are subject to multiple 
reasonable interpretations, the text of the FCPA is ambiguous.138  While 
parsing the legislative history, the court discovered that widespread 
bribery was causing foreign policy problems in the United States,139
because corporate graft prompts foreign officials to abuse their authority, 
inevitably leading to the disruption of market efficiency and foreign 
relations.140  The proposed Senate version of the bill banned payments 
intended to induce foreign officials to “act so as to direct business to any 
person, maintain an established business opportunity with any person, 
[or] divert any business opportunity from any person.”141  Given the 
pervasiveness of foreign bribery at the time the bill became law, the Fifth 
Circuit believed that federal legislators took a broad position to 
136 See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 1, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Nature’s Sunshine Prods., Inc., No. 
2:09-CV-00672 (D. Utah July 31, 2009), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/ 
comp21162.pdf (paying Brazilian customs agents to import unregistered company products into 
Brazil); Complaint ¶ 9, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Con-Way Inc., No. 1:08-CV-01478 (D.D.C. Aug. 
27, 2008), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20690.pdf (paying officials at 
the Philippines Bureau of Customs to allow the freight company to store shipments longer than 
otherwise permitted, and to settle company disputes with the Customs Bureau); Information at 9-10, 
United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., No. 4:07-CR-00004 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2007), available 
at www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vetco-controls/02-06-07vetcogray-info.pdf (payments 
to Nigerian Customs Officials to provide preferential treatment in the customs clearance process 
with respect to the importation of goods into Nigeria). 
137 See Kay, 359 F.3d at 742-56. 
138 Id. at 743-44.  The lack of clarity in the antibribery provisions of the FCPA cannot support 
a finding that subtle forms of bribery are within the purview of the Act.  Id.  Although the statute has 
not been ruled void for vagueness, the Fifth Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas agreed that the plain language of the text would lead reasonable minds to differ as 
to its interpretation.  See id. at 743-44; United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683 (S.D. Tex. 
2002), rev’d on other grounds, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). 
139 Kay, 359 F.3d at 746. 
140 Id.
141 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 17 (1977) (Conf. Rep.)) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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criminalize all forms of bribery.142  The court also referenced a 1988 
House Conference Report that stated that the “obtain or retain business” 
language was not limited to the renewal of government contracts, but 
included payments made for the purpose of obtaining favorable tax 
treatment.143
Although this language in the 1988 House Report concerning 
“favorable tax treatment” would appear to shed light on the prohibitions 
covered, Congress decided to leave the business nexus requirement 
unchanged in both of the subsequent amendments.144  The failure to 
include the relevant tax language in the text of the statute evidences the 
legislature’s inability to garner bicameral support for inclusion in the 
agreed-upon amendment.145  Notwithstanding the lack of any formal 
change to the nexus requirement through the legislative process, the Fifth 
Circuit found the tax language relevant in defining the scope of the 
FCPA.146  While doing so, the court cited Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC147 for the proposition that “‘[s]ubsequent legislation declaring the 
intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory 
construction.’”148
However, in discussing Red Lion Broadcasting, the U.S. Supreme 
Court explicitly stated that “[a] mere statement in a conference report of 
such legislation as to what the Committee believe[d] an earlier statute 
meant is obviously less weighty.”149  The guidance in Red Lion 
Broadcasting hinged on the existence of formally enacted legislation due 
142 Id. at 749; see also United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(finding that Congress intended the FCPA’s business nexus requirement to be construed broadly). 
143 Kay, 359 F.3d at 751 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 918-19 (1988) (Conf. Rep.)).  The 
Fifth Circuit found persuasive the House Conference Report that accompanied the 1988 amendment 
to the FCPA. Id.  That Report stated that the business nexus requirement was “not limited to the 
renewal of contracts or other business, but also includes a prohibition against corrupt payments 
related to the execution or performance of contracts or the carrying out of existing business, such as 
a payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining more favorable tax treatment.”  Id.
144 Although Congress amended a number of provisions in 1988, it refused to make any 
formal changes to the “obtain or retain business” element.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a) 
(1994). 
145 See generally Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 
Stat. 1107. 
146 The court believed that Congress’s attempt to narrowly define the exceptions and 
affirmative defenses, against a backdrop of broad applicability, authorized the FCPA to apply to 
payments that indirectly assist in obtaining business.  Kay, 359 F.3d at 756. 
147 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
148 Kay, 359 F.3d at 752 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969)) 
(emphasis added). 
149 Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 n.13 (1980) 
(discussing the Red Lion Broadcasting proposition cited by the Fifth Circuit) (emphasis added). 
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to the rigorous bicameral process.150  Moreover, the Court noted that 
subsequent legislative history of a less formal type serves as an 
“extremely hazardous basis for inferring” congressional intent.151
Despite the Supreme Court’s position with respect to subsequent 
legislative history, the Fifth Circuit heavily relied on the same type of 
conference report that—according to the Court—typically would not be 
very “weighty.”152  This reliance on the 1988 House Report was 
important to the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Kay that payments, which 
indirectly “obtain or retain business,” fall within the scope of the 
FCPA.153
Furthermore, Kay interpreted government reports that highlighted 
the SEC investigation when evaluating the breadth of the nexus.154  The 
SEC report issued in 1976 identified four types of illegal payments made 
by U.S. companies: (1) payments made to secure an advantage in the 
administration of foreign tax laws, (2) payments made for the purpose of 
obtaining or retaining government contracts, (3) payments to a low-level 
150 Id. (“Petitioners invoke the maxim that states: ‘Subsequent legislation declaring the intent 
of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction.’  With respect to subsequent 
legislation, however, Congress has proceeded formally through the legislative process.” (emphasis in 
original)).
151 Id.
152 Kay, 359 F.3d at 752; Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 447 U.S. at 117-18 n.13.  The Fifth 
Circuit justified its reliance on the conference report by noting that, “The amendments Congress 
passed in 1988 . . . expressly sought to clarify Congress’s intent from 1977.  Thus, the views and 
amendments of Congress in 1988 are necessary to our analysis of the precise scope of the original 
law.” Kay, 359 F.3d at 752 n.53.  But see the Supreme Court’s caution to lower courts in using 
statements in a subsequent conference report to determine the meaning of a statute: 
A mere statement in a conference report of such legislation as to what the Committee 
believes an earlier statute meant is obviously less weighty. 
  The less formal types of subsequent legislative history provide an extremely hazardous 
basis for inferring the meaning of a congressional enactment.  While such history is 
sometimes considered relevant, this is because, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated in United
States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805): “Where the mind labours to discover the design 
of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived.”  See Andrus v. Shell 
Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980).  Such history does not bear strong indicia of 
reliability, however, because as time passes memories fade and a person’s perception of his 
earlier intention may change.  Thus, even when it would otherwise be useful, subsequent 
legislative history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be 
gleaned from its language and legislative history prior to its enactment. 
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 447 U.S. at 117-18 n.13 (holding that a congressional member’s 
remarks during a 1976 committee hearing regarding a section of federal law enacted in 1972, are not 
entitled to much weight where the member was not a sponsor of the original legislation). 
153 See id. at 752 (stating that Congress’s views and amendments in 1988 are necessary to 
analyze the scope of the FCPA’s business nexus requirement); H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 918-19 
(1988) (Conf. Rep.). 
154 See id. at 747-49. 
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official to expedite the responsibility, and (4) political contributions.155
The government has explicitly criminalized the second and fourth 
categories, yet permitted the third.156  With respect to the first category, 
Kay noted that Congress intended to incorporate payments that 
contravened foreign tax laws (i.e. the first category) into the business 
nexus requirement.157  In doing so, the court emphasized the different 
terms used in the SEC report (“government contracts”)158 and in the 
enacted law (“business”).159  When examining the legislature’s intent in 
using different terms, the court determined that obtaining or retaining 
business was meant to be much broader and include payments made for 
government contracts.160  Because this intent was so broad, the court 
notes, payments made to affect the administration of foreign tax laws fall 
within the purview of business nexus requirement.161
However, this interpretation does not take into consideration one of 
the most dramatic bribery schemes that took place in the 1970s.  In an 
infamous scandal, corporate officials of United Brands Company162 paid 
$1.25 million to Honduran President Oswaldo Arellano in an effort to 
reduce the export tax on bananas.163  Once this bribery was uncovered, a 
Honduran coup overthrew the government, and United Brands became 
known as one of the most far-reaching bribery scandals at the time.164
Congress was well aware of the details involving United Brands,165 yet 
155 Id. at 747-48. 
156 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982) (defining the term “foreign official” to exclude 
government officials whose duties were clerical or ministerial). 
157 Kay, 359 F.3d at 748. 
158 The SEC report issued in 1976 only spoke of payments made for the purpose of “obtaining 
or retaining government contracts.”  Id. at 747-48. 
159 The FCPA as originally enacted referred to payments made for the purpose of obtaining or 
retaining business.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1982).  Cf. supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
160 Kay, 359 F.3d at 748. 
161 Id. at 748-49 (“[T]he concern of Congress with the immorality, inefficiency, and unethical 
character of bribery presumably does not vanish simply because the tainted payments are intended to 
secure a favorable decision less significant than winning a contract bid.”). 
162 United Brands Company was a fruit exporting business that imported bananas from 
Honduras into the United States.  The company later changed its name and is currently known as 
Chiquita Brands International, Inc. 100 Years and Counting, CHIQUITA, www.chiquitabrands.com/ 
companyinfo/History.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2012). 
163 Honduras: A Genuine Banana Coup, TIME, May 5, 1975, available at
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,913028,00.html?promoid=googlep. 
164 Scandals: A Record of Corporate Corruption, TIME, Feb. 23, 1976, available at
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,918067-1,00.html. 
165 See Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 345, 349-50 (2000).  The SEC initiated an investigation of United Brands Co. 
after its then-Chairman, Eli M. Black, threw himself out of the twenty-second floor of a New York 
City building. Id.  The investigation uncovered the bribery payments made to President Arellano, 
24
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there was no mention of “favorable tax treatment” in the FCPA’s text or 
legislative history, as originally enacted.166  In fact, congressional 
hearings were held in the context of illicit payments being made as a 
quid pro quo for new business or continuation of ongoing business.167
Many courts have applied the principle that “obtaining or retaining 
business” relates to the buying and selling of goods, acquiring or 
retaining government contracts, or other similar situations in which a 
business agreement would not have existed absent the payment.168  In 
cases where the existence of a business relationship between the host 
country and the U.S. entity is not dependent on the payment of money, 
application of the FCPA is inappropriate and not what the statute was 
intended to criminalize. 
The Fifth Circuit’s holding that the FCPA applies “broadly to 
payments intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in 
obtaining or retaining business”169 opens the door for the U.S. 
government to prosecute much less egregious behavior under the same 
statute.  Although U.S. businesses may hope that future judicial scrutiny 
will realign the business nexus interpretation with congressional intent, 
the U.S. government has turned that hope into an unattainable dream.  
The use of diversion agreements to resolve alleged FCPA violations 
prevents these cases from ever reaching court dockets and provides little 
incentive for businesses to vigorously defend their conduct. 
and on April 9, 1975, the SEC charged United Brands with securities fraud for failing to report the 
payment.  Id.
166 See S. REP. NO. 95-114 (1977) (Conf. Rep.). 
167 See id. at 4; H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (committee hearings 
regarding the FCPA were held against the backdrop of an SEC report issued in 1976 detailing 
hundreds of multinational corporations bribing foreign government officials to assist the 
corporations in gaining business).  The majority of bribery cases that Congress investigated when it 
enacted the FCPA involved government contracts.  See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT 
ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (May 12, 1976); S. REP.
NO. 95-114, at 1-2 (1977) (Conf. Rep.). 
168 See, e.g., United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (bus 
company made a payment to Saskatchewan government in return for a contract); Envtl. Tectonics v. 
W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988) (payment to Nigerian government to influence 
award of a Nigerian defense contract); Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford Enters., Inc., 826 F.2d 392 
(5th Cir. 1987) (payments made to the national oil company of Mexico in order to acquire several 
multi-million-dollar equipment contracts); United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 
334 (D. Conn. 1990) (payments made to officials of the Jamaica Tourist Board to retain advertising 
contract).
169 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755 (5th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 
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III. THE USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS
For the first twenty-five years of the FCPA, the DOJ brought only 
fifteen cases against citizens and corporations.170  Since the Kay decision 
in 2004, the U.S. government has aggressively stepped up enforcement 
and is collecting millions in civil and criminal penalties.171  However, the 
term “enforcement” does not mean that prosecutors are obtaining 
criminal convictions or even indictments; in fact, these cases rarely make 
it to trial.172  DOJ prosecutors are instead opting for deferred prosecution 
agreements (DPA) and non-prosecution agreements (NPA) (collectively 
known as “diversion agreements”) in an effort to bypass costly litigation 
in favor of alternative dispute resolution.173  Accordingly, the U.S. 
government’s forceful engagement in DPAs and NPAs has created a 
system that encourages prosecutorial abuse and deters corporate behavior 
originally intended by Congress in 1977 to be permissible.174
170 Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010,
12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 102 (2010). 
171 Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly 
Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 540 (2011) (“The apparent 
broadening [in United States v. Kay] of the business purpose element ‘energized’ enforcement 
agencies and contributed to ‘an explosion in FCPA enforcement actions’ relating to customs duties 
and tax payments.”); Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 918 
(2010); Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010, 12 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L.J. at 104-06 (noting that in 2010, ABB Ltd, a Swiss engineering company, paid $39 
million in civil and $19 million in criminal fines). 
172 Thomas Fox, 2009—The Year of the Trial, FCPA COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS BLOG (Dec. 
31, 2009, 12:37 AM), http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/tag/frederick-bourke/.
173 Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 932-33.  A 2005 report 
released by the Corporate Crime Reporter found that from 2002 to 2005, prosecutors entered into 
twice as many DPA and NPAs with large business institutions than during the previous ten years.  
CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, CRIME WITHOUT CONVICTION: THE RISE OF DEFERRED AND NON
PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (Dec. 28, 2005), available at www.corporatecrimereporter.com/ 
deferredreport.htm.  Among the many, these companies include Aetna, Bank of New York, Hilfiger, 
Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, Shell Oil, American International Group, KPMG, and PNC 
Financial. Id.
174 Compare H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (creating the “facilitating 
payments” exception to allow corporate payments to receive favorable treatment from low-level 
officials), and H.R. REP. NO. 100-576 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 
1954 (discussing amendment of the “facilitating payments” exception to include a list of discrete 
examples where payments for “routine governmental action” would not apply), with Complaint ¶ 1, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Nature’s Sunshine Prods., Inc., No. 2:09-CV-00672 (D. Utah July 31, 
2009), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21162.pdf (paying Brazilian 
customs agents to import unregistered company products into Brazil), and Information at 9-10, 
United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., No. 4:07-CR-00004 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2007), available 
at www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vetco-controls/02-06-07vetcogray-info.pdf (payments 
to Nigerian Customs Officials to provide preferential treatment in the customs clearance process 
with respect to the importation of goods into Nigeria). 
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A. DIVERSION AGREEMENTS DEFINED
In recent years, the DOJ and the SEC have used diversion 
agreements as a means of holding businesses criminally and civilly liable 
without entering the courtroom.175  These agreements are often the 
preferred method of resolving a dispute because of the dire consequences 
a formal indictment would have on the company’s business.176  The U.S. 
Attorneys’ Manual (“Manual”) states that the primary objectives of 
diversion agreements are 
[1] To prevent future criminal activity among certain offenders by 
diverting them from traditional processing into community 
supervision and services.  [2] To save prosecutive and judicial 
resources for concentration on major cases.  [3] To provide, where 
appropriate, a vehicle for restitution to communities and victims of 
crime.177
Although the Manual was written in the context of diverting the 
prosecution of an individual, the government has extended the scope of 
these agreements to cover corporations.178
DPAs and NPAs are privately negotiated contracts between 
government enforcement agencies and U.S. corporations.179  In an NPA, 
the government agrees to postpone indictment for a specified period of 
time so long as the corporation satisfies compliance and pecuniary 
175 Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 932-33.  In 1992, the 
DOJ and SEC entered into their first corporate NPA with Salomon Brothers for violating federal 
antitrust and securities laws.  Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution 
Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1863, 1863-65 (2005). 
176 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (Westlaw 2012).  Indictment of a U.S. corporation can cause a 
debarment or suspension of government contracts or subcontracts.  Id.
177 EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-22.010, 
available at www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/22mcrm.htm (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2012). 
178 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ABB Ltd and Two Subsidiaries Resolve 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Will Pay $19 Million in Criminal Penalties (Sept. 
29, 2010), available at www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-crm-1096.html (stating that 
ABB Ltd entered into a DPA with the DOJ and agreed to pay $19 million in criminal and $38 
million in civil penalties for paying $1.9 million in bribes to Mexican state-owned utility officials). 
179 See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., Fraud Section, to Edward J. 
Fuhr, Attorney for Alliance One International, Inc. (Aug. 6, 2010), available at 
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-npa.pdf 
(memorializing non-prosecution agreement); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. UBS 
AG, No. 09-60033-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2009), available at
www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=f25be713-a4c8-4685-80b0-9a8579ed228a. 
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rs
abuse their discretion.
B. KAY ENCOURAGES PROSECUTORIAL ABUSE
broad—with respect to corporate enforcement.188  These memos have not 
measures.180  The agreement states the simple facts, legal conclusions, an 
acknowledgment of responsibility, and a detailed compliance program 
that the corporation agrees to implement.181  In contrast, a DPA defers 
the prosecution of an already indicted defendant;182 the agreement is 
filed with the court and contains a short statement of facts along with 
legal conclusions and an acknowledgment of responsibility.183  Because 
of these diversion agreements, FCPA cases are rarely litigated; 
corporations would rather pay a penalty and implement compliance 
programs than engage in costly legal action.184  The U.S. government’s 
use of DPAs and NPAs has therefore impaled corporations with a 
“Morton’s Fork”185 and fostered an environment in which prosecuto
186
The guiding principles underlying a prosecutor’s decision to charge 
have evolved in the last decade.187  The DOJ’s issuance of four key 
memoranda has provided prosecutors with formal guidance—albeit 
180 See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., Fraud Section, to Edward J. 
uhr, Alliance One International, Inc. (Aug. 6, 2010), available at 
ment, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033-CR-
b. 18, 2009), available at www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx? 
2
y_
 choices are 
1 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 971-75 
010
om The Deputy Attorney Gen., Bringing Criminal 
harg
 Larry D. Thompson, Deputy 
F Attorney for 
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-npa.pdf. 
181 See, e.g., id.
182 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agree
COHN (S.D. Fla. Fe
fid=f 5be713-a4c8-4685-80b0-9a8579ed228a. 
183 See, e.g., id.
184 See John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 18, 2007), 
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battling_briber abroad/. 
185 A “Morton’s Fork” is defined as “a dilemma, especially one in which both
equally undesirable.”  Morton’s Fork Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/Morton%27s+Fork (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
186 See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 4
(2 ) (criticizing a number of government prosecutions where the alleged illegal payments 
appeared attenuated for any specific nexus required under the Act). 
187 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/ 
corporate_guidelines.htm; Memorandum fr
C es Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2008/06-
June/Holder1999BringingCrimCharges.pdf. 
188 Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial 
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1863 (2005) 
(“Federal prosecutors have extended deferred prosecution to corporations amidst the recent wave of 
corporate crime . . . .”); see also Memorandum from The Deputy Attorney Gen., Bringing Criminal 
Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2008/06-
June/Holder1999BringingCrimCharges.pdf; Memorandum from
28
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only precipitated the use of DPAs and NPAs, but have also served as the 
foundation for the government to broadly interpret the FCPA without 
interference from the judiciary.189
Beginning in 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice has taken various 
positions regarding its use of diversion agreements for corporate 
defendants.  Initially, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder circulated an 
internal memorandum (“Holder Memo”) that provided eight factors to 
consider in deciding whether to indict a corporation.190  The Holder 
Memo does not mention a prosecutorial preference for engaging in 
diversion agreements, but instead emphasizes how criminal prosecutions 
provide deterrence on a “massive scale.”191  Four years later, Deputy 
Attorney General Larry Thompson issued a different memorandum that 
made two significant changes to its predecessor.192  First, the document 
mandated that prosecutors weigh the factors in every federal corporate 
charge.193  Second, prosecutors were permitted to grant corporate 
immunity or engage in diversion agreements.194
The third memorandum, issued in December 2006 by Deputy 
Attorney General Paul McNulty, established a procedure that required 
prosecutors to obtain approval from Justice officials in Washington, 
D.C., when a waiver was sought for a corporation’s attorney-client and 
Attorney Gen., Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), 
available at www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm. 
189 See Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 907 (stating that 
diversion agreements not subject to judicial scrutiny are typically used to resolve an FCPA 
enforcement and are directly related to the absence of FCPA case law). 
190 Memorandum from The Deputy Attorney Gen., Bringing Criminal Charges Against 
Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2008/06-
June/Holder1999BringingCrimCharges.pdf.  The eight factors articulated by the Deputy Attorney 
General are (1) the nature and seriousness of the offense; (2) the pervasiveness of wrongdoing in the 
corporation; (3) whether the corporation has a history of similar conduct; (4) the timely and 
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing; (5) the adequacy of the corporate compliance program; (6) the 
medial actions, including efforts to correct illegal behavior; (7) collateral 
onse
mages/pdfs/529.pdf. 
corporation’s re
c quences to shareholders and employees; and (8) the adequacy of non-criminal enforcement.  
Id.
191 Id.
192 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/ 
corporate_guidelines.htm. 
193 Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, The Power of the Corporate Charging Decision 
over Corporate Conduct, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 306, 308 (2007), available at
www.yalelawjournal.com/i
194 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/ 
corporate_guidelines.htm. 
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ward forgoing litigation and 
optin
 conducting a retrospective analysis of existing 
diver
work-product privileges.195  Such a waiver provides prosecutors with 
significant leverage in being able to obtain the information they want 
when determining whether to defer prosecution.  Although this course of 
conduct was reversed in a subsequent memorandum issued by Deputy 
Attorney General Mark Filip, many believe that prosecutors continue to 
retain broad discretion in compelling privilege waivers because a 
corporation may still waive privileges if it “voluntarily chooses to do 
so.”196  As a result of these memoranda, the use of DPAs and NPAs to 
resolve corporate crimes has escalated to
g for massive agreed-upon penalties. 
The discretionary authority high-ranking Justice officials give to 
prosecutors facilitates a broad interpretation of the business nexus 
requirement, thereby leading to abuse.  The DOJ expressly states that it 
“interprets ‘obtaining or retaining business’ broadly, such that the term 
encompasses more than the mere award or renewal of a contract.”197
Keeping this announced interpretation in mind, the question now 
becomes, How much more does the term encompass?  Given the lack of 
any clear answer to this question, businesses can only speculate as to the 
scope of this element by
sion agreements.198
At a time when the DOJ expresses a clear policy of increased 
enforcement in white-collar crime,199 corporations are rushing to 
195 Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available at www.justice.gov/dag/ 
speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. 
196 See, e.g., Mark L. Rotert & Bradley E. Lerman, New Ethical Challenges in Internal 
Investigations, 1745 PLI/CORP 857, 862-63 (2009) (“[T]he Filip Memo says to corporations, we will 
decide whether and to what extent you have been cooperative by measuring the quality and quantity 
of the evidence you bring to us.  Because corporations have this incentive to produce a 
comprehensive account of the findings of their internal investigations, the corporation has as much 
incentive as before to waive its privileges.”); see also Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy 
Attorney Gen., Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), 
available at www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf (“[W]hile a corporation 
mai
c
 not to do so.”). 
re ns free to convey non-factual or ‘core’ attorney-client communications or work product—if 
and only if the orporation voluntarily chooses to do so—prosecutors should not ask for such 
waivers and are directed
197 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS 
(LAY-PERSON’S GUIDE), www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
198 See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 998 (2010) 
(stating that privately negotiated settlements serve as de facto case law even though they are subject 
to little or no judicial scrutiny). 
199 Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, Address at the 24th National Conference on 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at
www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html. 
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J’s aggressive interpretation of “obtaining or retaining
business.”203
cooperate in order to avoid criminal liability.200  Once the government 
becomes suspicious of wrongdoing, a company is subjected to the will of 
the government because of the immense damage that an indictment can 
inflict on a corporation’s social image and existing business 
agreements.201  Central to a decision of whether to settle is a cost 
analysis: if the cost of litigation—which includes the value of lost 
business and intangible harm to the corporation’s social image—is 
greater than the cost of paying fines and implementing compliance 
programs, then entering into a diversion agreement most efficiently 
resolves the dispute and quietly allows the corporation to continue with 
its business.202  The potential harm to corporate shareholders and long-
term growth also plays a role in the company’s willingness to go along 
with the DO
200 See John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 18, 2007), 
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battling_bribery_abroad/.  For businesses accused of FCPA 
iolat
8
ilable at 
ww ng
the In 
arg
ents of 
stei  t
.  The dearth of 
ase l
y has risked an FCPA court fight in 
v ions, staying in business is more important than going to court and creating precedent.  Id.  As 
a result, they will cooperate with the government and enter into diversion agreements rather than risk 
potentially ruinous consequences.  Id.
201 See Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB11646 395737834160.html; Benjamin M. Greenblum, 
Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1884-86 (2005); Corporate Crime Reporter, 
Interview with David Pitofsky, 19 CORP. CRIME REP. 46(8) (2005), ava
w.corporatecrimereporter.com/pitofskyinterview010806.htm (noting that immediately followi
 announcement of a criminal investigation, a company typically loses half its market value).  
uing that the use of DPAs unduly punishes corporations, Richard A. Epstein states that 
filing an indictment triggers huge collateral repercussions sufficient to drive the firm out of 
business, as teams of state and federal regulators are now duty-bound to suspend the licenses 
and permits under which the corporation does business.  Thus, the corporation that has strong 
protections against false convictions—proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elem
the crime, the ability to examine evidence or cross-examine witnesses—is helpless to protect 
itself.  A conviction carries at most a million-dollar fine, but simple indictment, which lies 
wholly within the prosecutor’s discretion, imposes multibillion-dollar losses. 
Ep n, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006. Fur hermore, a corporate 
indictment can trigger debarment or suspension from eligibility for government contracts.  See 48 
C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a) (Westlaw 2012). 
202 See John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 18, 2007), 
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battling_bribery_abroad/ (“Staying in business is more 
important than setting precedent to most companies, so they typically plead guilty or settle with the 
government rather than risk the potentially ruinous consequences of going to trial
c aw and widening intolerance of bribery can turn compliance into an international game of pin 
the tail on the donkey.  ‘As a lawyer, I expect laws to be readily transparent and easily 
predictable’ . . . . ‘The FCPA is neither.’” (quoting attorney Alexandra A. Wrage)). 
203 See David Voreacos, Swiss Shipper Finds Resistance Futile in U.S. Bribery Probe,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 12, 2010), www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-12/swiss-shipper-panalpina-
finds-resistance-is-futile-in-u-s-bribery-probe.html (“No compan
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Such a willingness to settle has only been exacerbated by the 
absence of judicial oversight in the negotiation of diversion agreements.  
Although the Speedy Trial Act grants the judiciary approval rights for 
DPAs,204 a Government Accountability Office report found judicial 
scrutiny of these agreements to be nonexistent.205  In fact, every NPA 
and DPA that the government negotiated with a U.S. company has been 
approved without judicial modification.206  Accordingly, prosecutors 
have replaced judges in the existing adjudicative system, effectively 
stripping companies of any bargaining power during the negotiation 
process.207  David Pitofsky, former Principal Deputy Chief of the 
Criminal Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, stated that companies 
have no say in defining the terms of a diversion agreement because of the 
government’s averseness to negotiation and its propensity to quickly 
withdraw from a settlement.208  Operating unconstrained, the government 
is able to dictate the terms of the agreement without review by the courts. 
This tremendous power allows the DOJ and the SEC to collect 
FCPA penalties based on their sole interpretation of the Act.209  By 
engaging in diversion agreements and interpreting the business nexus 
requirement to include payments that indirectly “obtain or retain 
business,” the DOJ brands corporations and their executives as criminal 
without having to satisfy strict criminal law standards.210  The broad 
tw ecades out of fear that a conviction could lead to a loss of public contracts and higher penalties, 
lawyers said.  After resolving two or three cases a year, the U.S. settled 47 corporate cases since 
2005 without trial, reaping $3.3 billion for the U.S. treasury.”). 
o d
y such offense must commence: . . . . (2) Any period 
en
greem defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the 
, 935 (2010). 
.
9, 2
ate-owned utility officials). 
J’s sometime expansive interpretations of the FCPA [are] never truly 
204 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(2) (Westlaw 2012) (“The following periods of delay shall be 
excluded in computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in 
computing the time within which the trial of an
of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to writt
a ent with the 
defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.”).
205 Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907
206 Id. at 936. 
207 See id. at 937; Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
28, 2006, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116468395737834160.html. 
208 Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 937. 
209 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ABB Ltd and Two Subsidiaries Resolve 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Will Pay $19 Million in Criminal Penalties (Sept
2 010), available at www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-crm-1096.html (stating that 
ABB Ltd entered into a DPA with the DOJ and agreed to pay $19 million in criminal and $38 
million in civil penalties for paying $1.9 million in bribes to Mexican st
210 See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE 
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (Jan. 4, 2011), available at
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010Year-EndUpdate-
CorporateDeferredProsecutionAndNon-ProsecutionAgreements.pdf (“[B]ecause FCPA allegations 
against corporations rarely, if ever, go to trial, and DPAs and NPAs are subject only to minimal 
judicial scrutiny, the DO
32
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discretion given to prosecutors under the Deputy Attorney Generals’ 
memoranda, combined with the shift in DOJ policy to combat corporate 
bribery, locks companies into diversion agreements.  An absence of 
judicial scrutiny of DPAs and NPAs allows the DOJ to command the 
outcome of any negotiation and ultimately creates an illusion of choice 
whereby businesses end up adopting government-stamped settlement 
agreements.211  In order to create more certainty in the corporate arena 
and to discourage an environment that fosters prosecutorial abuse, the 
courts must become involved. 
IV. SOLUTION: JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Despite Congress’s renewed efforts in holding committee hearings 
regarding the FCPA,212 legislative gridlock and scant approval ratings 
make it unlikely that congressional members will address criticisms.213
Nonetheless, judicial intervention in the enforcement of diversion 
agreements is available to alleviate some of the challenges that exist in 
this environment.  In particular, corporations would finally be given 
guidance as to how vague FCPA provisions—for example, the business 
nexus requirement—will be construed by the courts.  Such a solution 
would help to clearly demarcate the line between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, providing some certainty in FCPA compliance and 
tested.”); Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006 (stating that a DPA 
nder
gest that a climate where firms feel they must accept DPAs and NPAs embolden 
s.com/?p=2839 (“Hearings before the 
enate
7 PM), www.ibtimes.com/articles/296136/20120209/congress-approval-
ting-
u mines the separation of powers by eroding the protections of criminal law and turning the 
prosecutor into a judge). 
211 See David Voreacos, Swiss Shipper Finds Resistance Futile in U.S. Bribery Probe,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 12, 2010, www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-12/swiss-shipper-panalpina-
finds-resistance-is-futile-in-u-s-bribery-probe.html; see also Joe Palazzolo, Corporate News: FCPA 
Settlements Can Become Costly Burdens, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2011, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204618704576641414241674164.html (stating that 
corporations would rather forgo government prosecution in exchange for a long and costly 
settlement process that will require years of government supervision and millions to implement); 
Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 825 (2011) 
(“Commentators sug
the DOJ and SEC to advance broad and vague theories of FCPA liability that rarely, if ever, receive 
judicial scrutiny.”). 
212 Thomas O. Gorman, FCPA Enforcement: Crafting Incentives to Foster Compliance, SEC
ACTIONS BLOG (Dec. 2, 2010, 4:48 AM), www.secaction
S  Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, on November 30, 2010 considered 
testimony about FCPA enforcement and possible reform.”). 
213 Ashley Portero, Congress’ Approval Rating Reaches New Low at 10%: Gallup, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012, 3:2
ra 2012-gallup-10-percent.htm (noting that only ten percent of Americans approve of Congress’s 
job performance). 
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enfo
r this 
rcement.214  Furthermore, corporate defendants would have leverage 
to negotiate mutually agreeable terms for their diversion agreements.215
If the government continues to settle FCPA cases with deferred and 
non-prosecution agreements,216 the courts must become more involved to 
prevent prosecutorial overreaching and to ensure that FCPA claims 
contain a strong legal foundation.  Currently, these agreements are 
deficient in explaining whether the defendant’s conduct satisfies each 
element of the crime and whether there is proper legal precedent to 
punish the corporate defendant.  Instead, DPAs and NPAs simply recite 
legal conclusions.217  Once prosecutors and a corporate defendant have 
settled the terms of their compliance and corporate monitoring programs, 
the court should engage in a review of all admitted facts and legal 
analyses to ensure that the elements required for a successful FCPA 
action are satisfied by a greater weight of the evidence.218  Unde
214 In 2009, Dow Jones Risk and Compliance conducted a survey that found 51% of 
businesses delayed, and 14% abandoned, their business initiatives abroad due to confusion 
surrounding anti-corruption laws, including the FCPA.  See Press Release, Dow Jones, Dow Jones 
Survey: Amid Confusion About Anti-Corruption Laws, Companies Abandon Expansion Plans (Dec. 
, 200
RRED PROSECUTION AND 
ATE 
orporateDeferredProsecution-
012), available at
s, judges are permitted to make 
9 9), available at http://fis.dowjones.com/risk/09survey.html.  Furthermore, 40% of companies 
avoided expansion into emerging markets out of fear of noncompliance with bribery laws.  Id.
215 See Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 825 
(noting that the current FCPA environment, where diversion agreements rarely receive judicial 
scrutiny, encourages federal prosecutors to assert broad and vague theories of liability); GIBSON,
DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE DEFE
NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (Jan. 4, 2011), available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/ 
Documents/2010Year-EndUpdate-CorporateDeferredProsecutionAndNon-
ProsecutionAgreements.pdf (noting that because diversion agreements receive little to no judicial 
scrutiny, the government inevitably takes expansive and untested positions). 
216 See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2011 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPOR
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (Jan. 4, 2012), available at 
http://gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2011YearEndUpdate-C
NonProsecutionAgreements.aspx (noting that in 2011, DOJ agreements that settled FCPA charges 
accounted for approximately 41% of all settlement agreements). 
217 See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., to Paul Gerlach & Angela T. 
Burgess, Attorneys for Smith & Nephew, Inc. (Feb. 1, 2012), available at
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smith-nephew/2012-02-01-s-n-dpa.pdf (outlining the 
terms of the deferred prosecution agreement and providing a statement of facts, yet providing no 
analysis as to why the alleged facts prove an FCPA violation); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, 
United States v. Marubeni Corp., No. 12-CR-022 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/marubeni/2012-01-17-marubeni-dpa.pdf (diversion 
agreement providing only legal conclusions that the FCPA has been violated). 
218 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2), federal courts have the authority to scrutinize diversion 
agreements prior to giving their approval.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(2) (Westlaw 2012).  Also, the 
criminal sentencing phase of trial provides a useful analogy where detailed pre-sentence reports are 
created and a hearing is held to determine upward or downward departures from the Sentencing 
Guidelines range.  During these reviews of pre-sentence report
additional factual findings by a preponderance of the evidence under an advisory Sentencing 
Guideline scheme.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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appr
dge on the record.  Efficient 
parti
ill be 
bette
oach, judicial review of all DPAs and NPAs stemming from FCPA 
violations would be a requirement for an enforceable agreement.219
As part of its review process, a federal court should demand detailed 
information as to how the admitted facts violate the specific provisions 
of the Act.  This information should include (1) the specific portions of 
the FCPA alleged to have been violated, (2) the factual assertions 
supporting the government’s allegation of corporate wrongdoing, (3) 
how the admitted facts prove that each element of the relevant FCPA 
provisions has been violated, and (4) the legal precedents supporting the 
agency’s interpretation of the FCPA and its elements.220  The parties may 
provide this requisite information to the judiciary through a letter to the 
court or a request for a hearing to brief the ju
es would ultimately include this information in the diversion 
agreement to facilitate more rapid approval. 
The detailed information necessary to the review process is 
beneficial for two reasons: first, the courts will be able to more 
effectively scrutinize diversion agreements if the government is 
transparent about how it is interpreting specific provisions and the legal 
authority for its interpretation, and second, a detailed legal analysis 
would equip corporations with a framework from which they w
r able to mount defensive arguments, as well as provide critical 
guidance as to how prosecutors are construing relevant provisions. 
219 See Robert Plotkin et al., A New Era of Global Anti-Corruption Enforcement: FCPA and 
UK Bribery Act Spur a Worldwide Focus on Corruption Prevention, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 14, 2012), 
available at www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202541875631&A_New_Era_ 
of_Global_AntiCorruption_Enforcement&slreturn=1 (“[Richard Alderman, Director of the Serious 
Fraud Office in the United Kingdom,] does not . . . advocate a U.S.-style system in which 
prosecutors and corporations enter into ‘private agreements.’ Judicial oversight and approval is 
paramount, he says, for ‘[o]nly a judge can decide whether the terms are appropriate.’”) (emphasis 
added).  See also the GAO report, which finds that judicial scrutiny on diversion agreements is 
basically nonexistent and that judges have never modified a DPA or NPA.  Mike Koehler, The 
Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 935 (2010). 
 220  
For many years the DOJ also has faced critiques regarding the lack of clarity surrounding the 
factors considered when deciding whether to enter a DPA or an NPA.  In October 2010, the 
OECD publicly validated those concerns when it released its Phase 3 review of the United 
States’ anti-bribery enforcement.  In its report, the OECD noted that “[g]uidance on when 
prosecutors may use PAs, DPAs and  NPAs exists but is slightly uneven and indirect.”  The 
OECD also noted that “[p]ublishing more detailed reasons for entering into DPAs and NPAs 
would give more insight into the DOJ’s choice of settlement agreements and, thus, enhance 
accountability and transparency of the process.” 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE DEFERRED 
PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (Jan. 4, 2011), available at
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010Year-EndUpdate-
CorporateDeferredProsecutionAndNon-ProsecutionAgreements.pdf (footnote omitted). 
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behind the law.  Based on the legal 
autho
The overwhelming majority of civil and criminal FCPA actions are 
resolved almost identically, typically through parallel proceedings.223  In 
This detailed information would be especially useful for the vague 
FCPA provisions, namely the business nexus requirement.  Expansive 
and broadening interpretations of the nexus would remain in check 
because the DOJ’s allegations as to what payments are prohibited would 
no longer be the driving force 
rity cited by the government, the court can assess whether the 
DOJ’s interpretation is impermissibly far-reaching and thus unfair to the 
weaker party in a one-sided deal. 
In determining the nature and extent of their review of diversion 
agreements, courts must draw from other securities laws due to the 
meager FCPA case law that currently exists.221  Looking outside the 
bounds of the case and into another area of law for guidance on a legal 
issue is not foreign to the courts when those two areas are analogous.222
221 See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1079 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e consider it to 
be appropriate in some situations to seek guidance from civil jurisprudence in performing the 
criminal sentencing function, and do not hesitate to do so in this case . . . .”); United States v. 
Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 93 n.11 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district court may look to principles governing 
cove
irectors of a corporate general 
artner
tio o
re ry of damages in civil securities fraud cases for guidance in calculating the loss amount for 
purposes of the Guidelines.”). 
222 See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1146 (9th Cir. 2004) (“As the district court 
observed, there is a paucity of appellate court decisions analyzing section 877’s requirements for 
review.  In order to respond to the district court’s argument, therefore, I must reason by analogy and 
look to general principles of administrative law formulated under the APA.” (citation omitted)); 
Fernandez de Iglesias v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 352, 359 (2010) (“In ruling on Mexican law, a 
judge must look to the code, but ‘[i]f there are gaps or lacunae in the code (that is, there are no 
statutes which specifically pertain to the particular case), the judge must nevertheless decide the 
case, either by use of general clauses, by analogy, or by applying general principles of law.’” 
(citation omitted)); In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. Ch. 1991) (“While I find no 
corporation law precedents directly addressing the question whether d
p  owe fiduciary duties to the partnership and its limited partners, the answer to it seems to be 
clearly indicated by general principles and by analogy to trust law.”). 
223 In an enforcement action where the DOJ and SEC conduct parallel proceedings, the 
corporate defendant must pay millions in disgorgement, civil and criminal penalties, and the 
implementation of compliance and monitoring programs.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Charges Armor Holdings, Inc. with FCPA Viola ns in C nnection with Sales to the 
United Nations (July 13, 2011), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-146.htm; see also 
SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (listing all FCPA 
enforcement actions from 1978 to 2012 and whether each case was a parallel proceeding).  
Furthermore, in May 2011, the SEC entered into its first DPA to resolve an FCPA violation.  Press 
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s First-Ever Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112.htm.  
The settlement agreement entered into between Tenaris and the SEC contains many of the same 
terms as the DPAs executed by the DOJ.  Compare U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-
dpa.pdf (civil DPA), with Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., to Paul Gerlach &
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scrutinizing a corporate defendant’s settlement agreement in an 
FCP
a mere handmaiden to a settlement [that is] 
priva
settlement agreements that treat matters more akin to civil enforcement 
rather than traditional criminal prosecutions, the DOJ becomes a quasi-
civil regulator.224  This is because—in the context of corporate 
conduct—both parties are negotiating and agreeing from the outset as 
opposed to reaching an agreement after preparing for litigation.225  Thus, 
federal judges may borrow principles from other civil securities laws 
when
A case. 
Federal District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff’s widely publicized 
denial of a proposed settlement in S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Markets 
Inc.226 can serve as a guidepost for judges seeking to review a DPA.  In 
that case, the court determined that the applicable standard of review for 
a settlement of securities fraud charges is “whether the proposed Consent 
Judgment . . . is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest.”227
Judge Rakoff emphasized that before approving a consent decree the 
court must be satisfied that sufficient information has been provided to 
ensure that the government’s requested relief is justified.228  This is so 
“the court [does not] become 
tely negotiated . . . .”229
Although Citigroup Global Markets involved a civil securities fraud 
issue, federal courts reviewing FCPA diversion agreements should apply 
Angela T. Burgess, Attorneys for Smith & Nephew, Inc. (Feb. 1, 2012), available at
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smith-nephew/2012-02-01-s-n-dpa.pdf (criminal DPA). 
224 See Gabe Friedman, White-Collar Lawyers Await New FCPA Guidance, DAILY J., Mar. 2, 
2012 (noting that FCPA enforcement focuses on settlement rather than litigation, and that “‘[i]t 
asn’t
ibeaut,
attlin
ause corporations accused of FCPA violations are more 
in business, they prefer to settle rather than engage in costly litigation). 
xch. Comm’n v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR), 2011 
L 5
udgment.  Id. at *1. 
h  been a decision of do we charge or don’t charge a company.’ . . . ‘There’s been all these 
gradations of how can we strike agreements with these companies.’” (quoting professor of law Wes 
Porter)). 
225 See Mike Koehler, FCPA 101: How Are FCPA Enforcement Actions Typically Resolved?,
FCPA PROFESSOR, www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101#q15 (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (“Nearly every 
FCPA enforcement action against a company in this era of FCPA enforcement is resolved through a 
non-prosecution agreement (‘NPA’) or a deferred prosecution agreement (‘DPA’)”); John G
B g Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 18, 2007), www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
battling_bribery_abroad/ (noting that bec
interested in staying 
226 U.S. Sec. & E
W 903733 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011). 
227 Id. at *2. 
228 See id. at *3. 
229 Id. at *4.  The court in this case was troubled by the SEC’s long-standing policy of 
allowing corporate defendants to neither admit nor deny the allegations of the complaint when 
entering into a consent j
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ow the civil standard to review a criminal diversion 
agree
on of the FCPA, particularly the business nexus 
requirement.235
the same standard.230  Now that the SEC has shifted its policy of civil 
settlement in securities fraud cases to require admissions of conduct,231
these settlements appear almost identical to the DPAs handed down by 
Justice officials where admissions of fact and agreements to implement 
corrective programs exist in both.  Because these two types of 
agreements impact corporate defendants in an analogous manner, courts 
should borr
ment.
Accordingly, a diversion agreement or the ancillary information 
requested by the courts must be “fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the 
public interest.”232  Using its discretion, a court can evaluate whether the 
agreement is fair to both the parties and the public.233  In determining 
whether the agreement is “reasonable,” the court should examine 
whether the DOJ’s legal interpretations are consistent with congressional 
intent and statutory construction of the FCPA.234  Although courts 
provide deference to the government’s legal interpretation, the judiciary 
must still review agreements where one party has the obvious bargaining 
advantage.  Doing so serves as a critical check and balance designed to 
prevent federal prosecutors from unilaterally expanding the interpretation 
of any provisi
230 The author recognizes that the civil settlement agreement in Citigroup Global Markets
varied from traditional DOJ DPAs because of a corporate defendant’s ability to neither admit nor 
deny the alleged facts. 
231 Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Changes Policy on Firms’ Admission of Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
2012, available at www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/business/sec-to-change-policy-on-companies-
admission-of-guilt.html.  It is important to note that this policy shift applies only to civil settlement 
agreements where defendants have admitted wrongdoing in a corresponding criminal proceeding.  
Id.  The SEC is continuing to use the “neither admit nor deny” settlement process when they are the 
only agency reaching a deal with a defendant.  Id.
232 See Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 2011 WL 5903733, at *2. 
233 See id. at *3 (“Before the Court determines whether the settlement is fair, it must ask a 
preliminary question: fair to whom? . . . [T]he answer is, fair to the parties and to the public.”). 
 234  
[I]f the statute is ambiguous and Congress’s intent is not clear, “the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” If the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable and permissible, then the court should 
defer to the agency’s interpretation. 
Julia Di Vito, Note, The New Meaning of New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 307, 323 (2011) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 
(1984)).
235 See Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116468395737834160.html (stating that a DPA 
undermines the separation of powers by eroding the protections of criminal law and turning the 
prosecutor into a judge). 
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CONCLUSION
Congress’s attempt at curtailing foreign bribery with the passage of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 was initially greeted with an 
abundance of optimism.236  The primary function of the FCPA was 
twofold: first, to prohibit improper business practices, and second, to 
encourage more ethical business activity.237  In spite of Congress’s 
attempts at reining in unethical bribery payments, the FCPA was 
burdened with vague and ambiguous terms, leading to lax enforcement.  
In an effort to strengthen enforcement, Congress amended the FCPA in 
1988 and 1998.238  These congressional amendments, however, were 
silent as to a crucial component of the FCPA: the business nexus 
requirement.239  Because of this devastating omission, the vagueness of 
the Act persists, forcing American businesses to establish intricate and 
expensive compliance programs.  These programs have the effect of 
drastically increasing transaction costs, thus leading to inefficient 
markets.240
The Fifth Circuit’s 2004 decision in United States v. Kay sought to 
clarify the business nexus requirement and to enhance enforcement of the 
FCPA.  Though Kay has had an enormous impact on how the U.S. 
government prosecutes FCPA violations,241 these efforts have been 
accompanied by unintended consequences.  As a result of the sharp 
increase in FCPA cases post-Kay, the Department of Justice has favored 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.242  Though these 
236 S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098 (“A 
strong antibribery law is urgently needed to bring these corrupt practices to a halt and to restore 
public confidence in the integrity of the American business system.”). 
237 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 95-114 (1977) (Conf. 
Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098. 
238 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107; 
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302. 
239 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-576 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547.  
The conferees decided not to adopt the House bill that clarified the nexus requirement, leaving the 
Act unchanged with respect to this provision. Id. 
240 See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 1001-02 
(2010) (“[C]ompliance based solely on an enforcement agency’s untested or dubious interpretation 
of a law is wasteful and diverts corporate resources from other value-added endeavors.”). 
241 See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 MID-YEAR FCPA UPDATE (July 8, 2010), 
available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx (detailing 
the increasing trend in FCPA enforcement post-Kay).
242 See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial 
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1863 (2005) 
(due to a wave of white-collar crime, federal prosecutors have increased their use of diversion 
agreements for corporate defendants); GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 MID-YEAR FCPA
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agreements help to bypass costly litigation, they have essentially created 
a system that encourages prosecutorial abuse and deters behavior never 
intended by Congress in 1977 to fall within the scope of the FCPA. 
In order to combat these effects, the judiciary must take an active 
role in scrutinizing the settlement agreements entered into by corporate 
defendants.  The prevalence of such agreements prevents these cases 
from ever being litigated and creates an environment where prosecutors 
can broadly interpret the FCPA.  However, requiring the parties to a 
diversion agreement to provide the court with detailed information 
justifying the government’s allegations creates transparency and provides 
corporations with guidance as to how the FCPA and its provisions are 
interpreted.
Ultimately, U.S. businesses should not be subject to the whims of an 
idle legislature and aggressive executive.  Whether a company’s 
payments directly or indirectly obtain business, one fact remains clear: 
the lack of clarity regarding what types of behavior are prohibited has 
made the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act a highly feared law.  In an effort 
to calm these fears, federal courts must act to protect the rights of 
defendants.
UPDATE (July 8, 2010), available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Mid-
YearFCPAUpdate.aspx (detailing the increasing trend in FCPA enforcement post-Kay).
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